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Abstract 
This paper argues that mobility and migration have always been an intrinsic part of human 
development. Migration can be considered as a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom 
itself. However, any meaningful understanding of migration needs to simultaneously analyse 
agency and structure. Rather than applying dichotomous classifications such as between forced 
and voluntary migration, it is more appropriate to conceive of a continuum running from low to 
high constraints under which migration occurs, in which all migrants deal with structural 
constraints, although to highly varying degrees. Besides being an integral part of human 
development, mobility also tends to affect the same structural processes of which it is part. 
Simplistic positive-versus-negative debates on migration and development can be overcome by 
integrating agency-structure dialectics in the analysis of migration impacts. This paper argues 
that (i) the degree to which migrants are able to affect structural change is real but limited; (ii) 
the nature of change in sending and receiving is not pre-determined; and (iii) that in order to 
enable a more focused and rigorous debate, there is a need to better distinguish and specify 
different levels and dimensions at which the reciprocal relationship between human mobility and 
development can be analysed. A critical reading of the empirical literature leads to the 
conclusion that it would be naïve to think that despite their often considerable benefits for 
individuals and communities, migration and remittances alone can remove more structural 
development constraints. Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can 
neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in 
generally unattractive investment environments. By increasing selectivity and suffering among 
migrants, current immigration restrictions have a negative impact on migrants’ wellbeing as well 
as the poverty and inequality reducing potential of migration.  
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
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articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1. Introduction  
There is a common failure in much research and, particularly, policy to analyse migration as an 
integral part of development and global transformation processes rather than a problem to be 
‘managed’ or ‘solved’ by tackling its perceived root causes. Human mobility has always been an 
intrinsic part of human development. Human mobility plays a central role in global and local 
processes of social, economic and political change: it is both moulded by and helps to mould 
these global transformations. In order to understand how mobility is part of structural change, but 
can also affect the nature and direction of change or ‘development’, it is vital to explore the 
dialectics between structure and agency involved in human mobility.  
 
On the one hand, mobility at the individual and group level cannot be dissociated from more 
general processes of social and economic change which constantly alter the spatial distribution of 
opportunity structures and, hence, mobility patterns. However, it would be erroneous to reduce 
migrants to pawns passively reacting to macro-forces propelling them around the globe. People 
have agency, and, on the individual level, the decision to migrate (or not) and the act of 
migrating can generally be seen as an expression of human development. People need a certain 
minimum of social and economic resources in order to be able to migrate. It is therefore no 
coincidence that wealthy people and societies tend be generally more mobile than relatively poor 
people and societies.  
 
Because people have agency, their mobility is also a potential force for structural change, 
because it can play an important part in altering the social and economic conditions in both in 
sending and receiving localities, regions and countries. Mobility – the act of moving – almost 
inevitably affects people’s differential access to social, economic and human resources. 
However, it is important to emphasise that all migrants face structural constraints and that the 
degree to which they can exercise agency is fundamentally limited. This also limits the extent to 
which migrants and migration can bring about structural change. 
 
The fact that all migrants face constraints also upsets the conventional dichotomy between forced 
and voluntary migration. For instance, many migrants who primarily move for work do so 
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because they face severe constraints on personal development at home, and the range of 
migration options available to them tends to be constrained and structured by economic, political 
and social relations. Likewise, those who are usually characterised as forced migrants, such as 
refugees, exercise their agency as far as possible in the face of appalling circumstances. It is only 
with extreme movements such as slavery and deportation that agency may be discounted 
completely.  
 
It is therefore probably more appropriate to conceive of a continuum running from low to high 
constraints under which migration occurs, rather than applying a dichotomous classification of 
forced versus voluntary migration to much more complex realities in which all migrants deal 
with structural constraints, although to highly varying degrees. The sharp distinction between 
forced and voluntary migration is primarily a policy and legal distinction driven by the interest of 
states in classifying migrants and – as other distinctions such as between regular and irregular 
migration – to determine migrants’ legal rights. Such policy and legal categories may be useful 
tools for states; they only become problematic when they are uncritically adopted as analytical 
categories and projected onto social realities. They seem to become even more problematic when 
they are applied to persons rather than to migratory phenomena. For instance, while certain 
forms of moves may be classified as ‘forced’, ‘irregular’ or ‘transit’, to apply such labels to 
migrants themselves is problematic because it obscures migrants’ agency and the fact that the 
motivations, aspirations, legal statuses and constraints they face tend to change over time and 
while they move.  
 
A fundamental paradox is that human development increases people’s capabilities to be mobile 
over increasingly large distances but that, at the same time, people’s motivations to migrate can 
be expected to be higher when they face relatively high social, economic and/or political 
constraints in the places, regions and countries where they live. Put differently, development 
constraints are likely to motivate people to move to another place and country, but at the same 
time they need the resources to do so. For example, international South-North migration tends to 
involve high costs and may entail significant risk. It is therefore not surprising that South-North 
migration from many countries with low levels of human development – such as in sub-Saharan 
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Africa – tends to be low and more selective for the relatively wealthy and skilled. South-North 
migration from middle-income countries not only tends to be significantly higher but also less 
selective for the higher educated.  
 
What is the significance of these reflections on how human development affects mobility for the 
debate on how mobility affects human development in its own right? First, the insight that people 
exercise their agency to move within constraining conditions also implies that the degree to 
which migrants are able to affect structural change in sending and receiving societies is real but 
at the same time fundamentally limited.  
 
Second, it means that the nature of mobility-affected conjunctural and structural change in 
sending and receiving societies is not pre-determined. This impact fundamentally depends on (1) 
the way mobility affects individuals’ capabilities, which is to a great extent dependent on the 
selectivity of migration and the socio-economic and legal position of migrants at the destination; 
(2) the general development context in (2a) sending and (2b) receiving contexts and (3) the 
migrants’ own preferences and their relationship with their country of origin.  
 
Thus, migration impacts tend to be highly heterogeneous depending on the specific 
circumstances in which migration occurs. For instance, if people migrate under extremely 
constraining conditions – such as in the case of refugee migration – migrating will often be the 
‘least worse’ option, which may involve a real decrease in wellbeing and capabilities from the 
pre-refugee situation. In other cases, migrants may individually gain from their mobility but this 
will not automatically translate into macro-structural change and national development because 
their decision of where to allocate their activities fundamentally depends on how they perceive 
the more general opportunity structures in origin and destination societies. This means that, 
depending on circumstances, mobility can theoretically have positive, less positive or sometimes 
even negative implications for more general development processes.  
 
If economic conditions are bad in origin countries or if political instability and distrust prevails, 
it is unlikely that migrants will make massive investments in their country of origin or that they 
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will return in significant numbers. For instance, in a country such as Somalia, while migrants’ 
remittances may have enabled significant improvements in living standards for individual 
families and communities in some areas – in particular Somaliland (Kleist 2008) – there is no 
sign that they are able to generate take-off development in the absence of a central government, 
under circumstances of insecurity and under dismal investment conditions.  
 
Third, this reveals the necessity to bring more precision into the debate by distinguishing and 
specifying the different levels and dimensions at which the reciprocal relationship between 
human mobility and development can be analysed. Dominant notions of development are centred 
on national (economic) growth. This tends to coincide with a relative neglect of the potential 
contribution of migration to development at the individual level.  
 
Development is not only a complex multi-dimensional concept, but can also be assessed at 
different levels of analysis and has different meanings within different normative, cultural and 
historical contexts. It may therefore be an illusion that there can be a single, universal definition 
of development. For instance, dominant notions of development widely view rural-urban 
migration in poor countries and South-North migration as symptoms of development failure. In 
such approaches, by implication development tends to be seen as a remedy against migration. 
However, this sedentary bias on which such conventional understandings of migration and 
human development are based is challenged by empirical evidence pointing at the generally 
positive associations between levels of human development and mobility. 
 
The aim of this paper is to further explore how mobility can be conceptualised as an intrinsic part 
of human development at both macro and micro levels. Although the focus will be on 
international mobility, there is no a priori reason why these cannot be applied to internal 
mobility. By focusing on the dialectics between structure and agency, it aims to improve 
understanding of how mobility it is both moulded by and helps to mould human development. 
First, this paper will briefly review how fundamental shifts in global mobility patterns over the 
last two and a half centuries have been intrinsically connected to structural transformation 
processes associated with modern capitalist development, urbanisation, demographic transitions 
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and a series of technological revolutions. Second, this paper will review evidence of the 
implications of migration for various dimensions and scales of development in sending and 
receiving societies. Third, this paper will explore how these insights into mobility may challenge 
conventional, sedentary notions of human development. It will conclude by outlining the policy 
implications of this analysis. Although this paper is general in its aims and scope, it will 
particularly draw on examples of African migration to illustrate its arguments.  
 
2. Historical overview: shifting global mobility patterns as part of structural change  
2.1. Capitalism, the nation state and the emergence of modern mobility 
Current global migrations may be new in scale, nature and scope, but population movements in 
response to demographic growth, and the development of production and trade have always been 
part of human history. Warfare, conquest, formation of nations and the emergence of states and 
empires have all led to migrations, both voluntary and forced. The enslavement and deportation 
of conquered people was a frequent early form of forced labour migration. In many parts of 
Africa, pastoralism was often associated with long distance trade, cultural exchange and the 
regular settlement and uprooting of people (Bakewell and de Haas 2007).  
 
However, current patterns of migration are fundamentally different from those in pre-industrial 
societies both in geographical scope and in intensity. While migration and mobility at large have 
always been part of human history, the nature and scope of migration has fundamentally changed 
over the past two centuries in response to revolutionary technological and economic 
developments and the incorporation of an increasing number of regions and countries across the 
world within international capitalism. This process of increasing global integration started with 
European mercantile and colonial expansion—some say even earlier—and accelerated after the 
Industrial Revolution.  
 
From the end of the Middle Ages, the development of European states and their colonisation of 
the rest of the world gave a new impetus to international migrations of many different kinds, 
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including movements of soldiers, administrators and traders to colonised areas, forced 
movements of African slaves to the New World1 and, later on, indentured workers from India 
and China to East Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere. Beginning in the seventeenth century, 
North Sea countries, and further extending throughout Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the spatial diffusion of the processes of capitalist development and the associated 
demographic transitions resulted in large-scale rural-to-urban migration within Europe and North 
America (Castles and Miller 2009; Moch 1992; Skeldon 1997).  
 
The wealth accumulated in Western Europe through production using the ‘unfree’ labour (Cohen 
1987) of slaves, indentured workers and other forms of colonial forced labour provided much of 
the capital which was to unleash the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In turn, the Industrial Revolution and the associated concentration of economic 
production in towns and cities gave a major impetus to rural-urban migration within and across 
borders. At the same time, the mechanisation of agriculture led to declining demand for 
agricultural labour. Rapidly declining death rates following improvements in health care and 
hygiene resulted in accelerating population growth. The resulting surplus in rural labour 
subsequently migrated to towns and cities, further reinforcing existing urbanisation processes 
and the transfer from predominantly agricultural to industrial national economies. The 
technological progress which accompanied the rise of modern industrialist capitalism has been a 
key factor in facilitating large-scale migration, particularly through dramatic improvements in 
infrastructure and faster, safer and cheaper means of transport. So, migration played an important 
part in industrialisation, and was associated to significant international migration of, for instance, 
Irish to Britain, Poles and Italians to Germany, France and Switzerland, and Irish, Italians and 
Jews from various European countries to the USA. 
 
While most international migration took, and still takes, place between adjacent countries, 
                                                 
1 The slave trade is an extremely violent form of forced migration to be distinguished from contract laborers or other 
more-or-less voluntary labor migrants. It is believed that more than 11.8 million people were taken from Africa to 
the Americas (Lovejoy 1989). This slave trade ‘was the largest, enforced, mass migration of labor in human history’ 
(Nayyar 2000:2). Notwithstanding the massive scale of the trans-Atlantic slave trade set up by Europeans, African-
European, African-African, and African-Arab slave trade as such is a much older phenomenon.  
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technological progress facilitated longer journeys. This became particularly apparent during the 
‘first wave of globalisation’ (1870-1914), in which transatlantic migrants totalled over 50 million 
(Nayyar 2000) and there were similar, if not larger, migrations to South-East and North Asia 
(McKeown 2004). The interwar period (1918-1939) was characterised by increasing 
protectionism and also more restrictions on migration. After 1929, the Great Depression further 
restricted population mobility.  
 
Refugee movements go far back in history, such as the migration of Muslims and Jews to 
Morocco and the Ottoman Empire after the completion of the reconquista of the Iberian 
Peninsula in the late fifteenth century. However, it was the massive displacement of millions of 
people across Europe and Asia following the First and Second World Wars that stimulated the 
establishment of the global refugee regime (Karatani 2005; Marfleet 2007).  
 
2.2. The integration of the global South into capitalist mobility systems  
In most of the current global ‘South’, the structural political and economic changes brought by 
colonisation – and particularly capitalist expansion and urbanisation – deeply affected ancient 
migration patterns and created new forms of population mobility, in a way that does not seem to 
be fundamentally different from the earlier experiences in Europe and North America 
(Onyeonoru 1994; Skeldon 1997). Processes of large-scale rural-to-urban migration within and 
across borders gained momentum in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and were intimately 
linked to the connected and overlapping processes of colonisation, the progressive incorporation 
of peasant economies into the capitalist economy, and globalization.  
 
These processes of colonisation and capitalist development created a new demand for cheap 
labour, which set in motion rural-rural and, particularly, rural-urban migration patterns which 
significantly differed from pre-colonial population mobility. In the Maghreb, for instance, 
traditionally circular and seasonal migration patterns were gradually replaced by more long-term 
forms of rural-to-urban migration (Berriane 1997). When the first Europeans arrived in West 
Africa in the fifteenth century, they disrupted traditional patterns of (trans-Saharan) trade and 
seasonal movement while the growing slave trade led to the transportation of 11-12 million 
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Africans across the Atlantic (Anarfi and Kwankye 2003; Bump 2006; Lovejoy 1989). Since the 
late nineteenth century, colonisation and the concomitant establishment of cacao, coffee and 
groundnut plantations, infrastructure works and the growth of cities such as Accra, Lagos, Kano, 
Ibadan, Abidjan, Lomé, Dakar and Cotonou triggered major rural-rural and rural-urban migration 
(Arthur 1991a). Other factors that are believed to have stimulated such migration were 
infrastructure improvements, the introduction of colonial taxes (Arthur 1991a), organised labour 
recruitment (Bump 2006), and the expropriation of agricultural land for plantations (Amin 1974).  
 
Since colonisation, intra-regional mobility in West Africa has been characterised by a 
predominantly North-South, inland-coast movement from Sahel West Africa (Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Niger and Chad) to the plantations, mines and cities of coastal West Africa (predominantly 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, and in the West to Senegal and The Gambia) (Arthur 
1991b; Findlay 2004; Kress 2006). Complying with pre-colonial patterns, much intra-regional 
migration is seasonal or circular, although an increasing number of migrants have settled in the 
coastal destination countries.  
 
Although colonial administrators generally wished to restrict population mobility, they could not 
prevent increasing settlement of migrants in mining towns, major cities and other urban centres 
(Bakewell 2008). After decolonisation, rural-urban migration continued and often even 
intensified. Although many governments have tried to stop this ‘rural exodus’ (cf. De Soto 
2000), they were not able to prevent this migration, which was driven by processes of economic 
restructuring, demographic growth and urbanisation.  
 
Decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s created the conditions for new patterns of movement 
from former colonies to the mainly European metropoles at an unprecedented scale. This started 
with large-scale return migration of colonial settlers and their descendants, such as the colons or 
pieds noirs from Algeria to France (de Haas 2008), but was soon followed by the migration of 
members of the majority populations of these countries. This postcolonial migration was 
facilitated by common historical and linguistic links. In most cases there were initially low 
migration barriers – for instance, in the British Commonwealth the people of former colonies 
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actually had British citizenship until 1983, and could therefore migrate freely at least until 1962, 
when restrictions were introduced with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. 
 
This increase in what came to be known as South-North migration was also facilitated by rapid 
post-war economic growth in northwest Europe and North America, which led to increasing 
shortages of mainly unskilled labour to work in sectors such as industry, mining and agriculture.2 
In some European countries such as the UK and France, part of this labour demand was filled by 
immigration from former colonies. However, over the 1950s and 1960s an increasing proportion 
of demand was met by migration from poorer, often neighbouring countries such from Mexico to 
the US and from southern Europe, the Maghreb and Turkey to northwest Europe (Castles and 
Delgado Wise 2008; Castles and Miller 2009).  
 
2.3. Political-economic forces majeures and shifts in global mobility 
Rather than migration policies per se, global political-economic forces majeures have tended to 
set the preconditions for major recent shifts in global mobility patterns. The 1973 ‘Oil Crisis’ 
was a major turning point in global migration patterns, in which fundamental shifts in the 
international political economy led to the emergence of new migration poles located outside the 
traditional ‘North’. On the one hand, the ‘Oil Crisis’ and the associated economic recession 
accelerated the decline of labour-intensive industries in Europe and North America and the 
subsequent delocalisation of labour-intensive industries to low wage countries. In Europe, the Oil 
Crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in rising structural 
unemployment and a lower demand for unskilled labourers. This hit the guest-workers from 
Turkey and the Maghreb disproportionally and led to their mass unemployment. This heralded 
                                                 
2 An interesting question raised by one of the reviewers remains why South-North migration was not very prevalent 
during the first wave of globalization. This can perhaps be partly attributed to the low levels of development in the 
global south, but also the fact that within the current ‘North’, there was rather abundant supply of cheap labour due 
to the still high demographic growth, the expulsion of labour from the agrarian sectors and the fact that many 
Western countries were still relatively poor. During the current wave of globalisation, most Western countries have 
completed their demographic transitions, and dispose of an often shrinking pool of young, native workers. At the 
same time, international socio-economic inequalities between North and South have increased tremendously, while 
during the first post-independence decades, most Southern countries witnessed high population growth. The 
combination of these factors has boosted international South-North migration.  
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the end of the ‘recruitment phase’ and the onset of increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
pursued by European states, a trend that would persist until the present day.  
 
However, these policies failed to stop immigration. European states and origin countries tried to 
encourage migrants to return. The failure of these return policies was primarily related to the lack 
of opportunities for economic reintegration in most countries of origin, which suffered much 
more than the European countries from the structurally higher oil prices and the global economic 
downturn, while both Turkey and Morocco were confronted with political instability. 
Consequently, these policies did not lead to the large-scale return of temporary workers to 
Turkey, Morocco and other Mediterranean countries, but rather to massive family reunification 
and the permanent settlement of migrant populations. Paradoxically, the increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies and in particular the introduction of visa restrictions had the effect of 
pushing migrants into permanent settlement rather than the reverse (Entzinger 1985; Fargues 
2004). 
 
Quite on the contrary, for the oil countries located around the Persian Gulf, the events of 1973 
marked the beginning of massive labour recruitment. This caused a ‘remarkable reversal of 
relative economic conditions’ (Sell 1988:93) between Egypt and its Arab neighbours. Surging oil 
prices and massive investments of petro-dollars in huge construction, industry and infrastructure 
projects in Gulf countries led to large-scale labour migration. Fundamental change in Egypt 
towards more liberal, less protectionist economic policies and a shift from anti-emigration 
towards pro-emigration policies and unprecedented economic growth in the oil producing Gulf 
countries and also Libya coincided to cause unprecedented migration from Egypt and other 
MENA (Middle East and North African) countries to the booming Gulf countries.  
 
Initially, the governments of oil-rich Arab countries preferred workers from other Arab countries 
because of geographical and linguistic proximity as well as solidarity motives. After 1983, the 
Iran-Iraq war, falling oil prices and declining demand for construction workers, led to a relative 
decline in the demand for Egyptian and other Arab workers in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) countries and Libya. Although Arab immigration never stopped, this led to increasing 
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immigration of cheaper South Asian, South-East Asian and also, often irregular sub-Saharan 
workers (de Haas 2008; de Regt 2006; Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). These workers were 
preferred as Arab workers were more and more seen as a political liability, in particular after 
official Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War led to mass 
expulsions of Palestinians from Kuwait. What might also have played a role in increasing Asian 
immigration is the adoption of a pro-emigration set of policies in an increasing number of Asian 
countries (Abella 1995).  
 
Although the 1991 Gulf War led to massive expulsions, it did not lead to a permanent change in 
migration trends, except that some governments (such as Kuwait) were keen to replace Arab 
migrants, who were seen as politically suspect, with Asian workers, who were generally seen as 
a more docile workforce. However, migration from Egypt, Sudan and other African countries to 
the Gulf has often been more persistent and permanent than the temporary migration policies 
intended. In fact, after the Gulf war, migration rates quickly resumed to pre-War levels (Zohry 
and Harrell-Bond 2003). Semi-legal migrants enter through intricate systems of visa-trading 
(IOM 2005), and undocumented labour migrants enter the Gulf through making the hadj, the 
Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Bakewell and de Haas 2007). 
 
In other regions, the sudden oil wealth led to the emergence of new immigration poles. In sub-
Saharan Africa for instance, Nigeria emerged as a major destination for intra-African migrants in 
the 1970s and 1980s. However, misguided economic policies and a major decline in oil 
production and prices heralded a long period of economic downturn alongside with sustained 
political repression and mass expulsions of migrants. At the same time, rapid export-led 
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s transformed several countries in East and South East 
Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and more recently Thailand into 
migration destinations in their own right (Castles and Miller 2009). At the same time, the new 
international division of labour and the associated shift towards service-based, knowledge 
intensive economies led to an increasing demand for high skilled sector workers in the global 
North. In addition, increased female labour participation, spectacular fertility declines, the 
demand for foreign marriage partners and population ageing have increased the demand for 
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lower-skilled service sector workers. Equally, certain jobs in industry, construction and 
agriculture cannot be outsourced and continue to attract low skilled workers.  
 
There are two fundamental reasons why migration policies appear to have failed to curb 
migration. Apart from sustained labour demand in an increasingly multi-polar world of multiple 
migration destinations, mobility seems to have been further spurred by reduction of travel costs 
and the revolution of communication technology, connecting people over increasingly distant 
places (cf. Castells 1996). In particular since the late 1970s, advances in road and, particularly, 
air transport and communication technology and a gradual breakdown of trade barriers and 
international political integration have spurred a second wave of globalization. The enormous 
reduction in costs of transportation and communication have facilitated the closer integration of 
the countries and peoples of the world, and the breaking down of barriers that have facilitated the 
increasing flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge across borders (Stiglitz 2002:9). 
However, curiously enough, this does not apply for the movement of people, and particularly 
those living in the global South. Paradoxically, over the same period of globalisation, wealthy 
countries have increased legal restrictions and intensified border controls on migration from 
poorer countries including ex-colonies. In addition, the effect of lower transport costs and greater 
communications technology on migration is not unambiguous. For instance, this also makes 
outsourcing more feasible and thus potentially diminishes the demand of more developed 
countries for immigrants.3 The combination of these factors perhaps explains why the global 
number of migrants as a percentage of the world population has hardly changed over this period.  
 
Nevertheless, such restrictions have not been able to reverse the remarkable increase in South-
North migration which has constituted the most fundamental shift in global migration patterns 
over the twentieth century. Following post-WWII decolonisation and rapid economic growth in 
Western societies, there has been a reversal of global migration movements, in which South-
North migration has strongly increased. There has been an increasing concentration of migrants 
in developed countries. A large share of this increase can be attributed to increasing South-North 
                                                 
3 The author would like to thank one of the reviewers at UNDP for drawing his attention to this point.  
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migration. Between 1960 and 2005 the percentage of immigrants living in the developed regions 
has increased from 43 to 63 percent (UNDESA 2006). Recent estimates suggest that over half 
these immigrants originate from the developing world.4  
 
It is important to note here that the current wave of globalisation is fundamentally different from 
the one that occurred between 1820 and 1914, because the initial conditions are different. Before 
the first wave, the largest part of the world population was agrarian and differences in human 
development were relatively small. When the second wave began, it was sharply divided 
between rich and poor nations (Baldwin and Martin 1999). Within this context, the recent surge 
in South-North migration does not come as a surprise, certainly if we take into account the 
fundamental improvements in transport and communication technology, which have increased 
people’s capabilities and aspirations to move.  
 
A second fundamental change has been the dramatic increase in global interconnectivity due to 
advances in information and communication technology. Although the relative number of 
international migrants has remained fairly stable over the past century, the overall mobility of 
people has increased. This has not only facilitated the massive growth in tourism and short-term 
business travel and commuter mobility, but has also vastly increased the scope for migrants to 
travel back and forth and maintain transnational social, economic and political ties with origin 
countries. Although the scale of these movements is much larger than for any other form of 
mobility, they are not usually covered in migration statistics (Iredale 2008). Moreover, non-
migration mobility can give rise to migration, for instance to service tourist needs, and tourism 
and student migration can metamorphose into de facto labour migration (Hugo 2006). Business 
people are engaging in trade and other activities over long-distances, while other business people 
are moving as part of intra-company transfers or related arrangements (Iredale 2008). 
 
                                                 
4 Global Migrant Origin Database v4, Sussex University, updated March 2007, 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls 
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2.4. Challenging sedentarist assumptions  
The above overview has shown how migration has been part and parcel of more general 
processes of nation state building, capitalist expansion, national economic growth, national 
industrial development, demographic transitions and urbanisation. These processes all tend to be 
conditional on the transfer of labour from rural to urban areas both within and across borders, 
while such labour migration seems to further reinforce processes of capitalist accumulation and 
the increasing concentration of economic activities in urban centres. Together with the 
mechanisation of agriculture and the expulsion of labour from the agricultural sector, this further 
fuels migration. This suggests that migration and development are not just reciprocally linked, 
but part and parcel of the same process.  
 
The above analysis seems adequate and it still seems useful for understanding currently 
occurring rural-urban migration in many parts of the global South. However it is based on a 
narrow view of development as process of incorporation into the capitalist global system 
entailing both industrialisation and urbanisation. Notwithstanding their radically opposed 
predictions in terms of development outcomes (factor price equalisation vs. deepening 
development disequilibria), both neoclassical and neo-Marxist migration theory see rural-urban 
migration within and across borders as an integral part of such a process of capitalist 
development, by which surplus labour in the rural sector supplies the workforce for the urban 
industrial economy (Lewis 1954; Todaro 1969).  
 
Patterns of mobility have been frequently linked to specific stages of economic development and 
economic, technological and demographic transitions (de Haas 2007b; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 
1971). Such ‘transitional’ models are very useful to understand how development processes tend 
to be linked to specific forms of mobility and also help to understand that development tend to 
coincide with increasing (and not decreasing—as is often assumed) mobility and migration. 
However, their main conceptual flaw is the suggestion that there is an unilinear path towards 
development, akin to modernization theory (Rostow 1960). Thus, much of mainstream migration 
theory is firmly entrenched in a ‘modernist ideology’ (Simon 2006: 11) – common to these 
various schools of development thinking, including modernization, dependency and world 
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systems theories – which holds to a fundamental belief in the concept of progress,  
 
While this conception of development may appear to entail, or even demand, a high level of 
mobility, it creates two fundamental problems for the analysis of the relationship between 
migration and development.  
 
First, it is based on the erroneous assumption that traditional, non-industrial societies are largely 
immobile. Perceptions that migration is a new phenomenon closely linked to modern capitalist 
development are based on the ‘myth of the immobile peasant’ (Skeldon 1997: 7-8), or the 
implicit assumption in much of (Western) popular and scholarly thinking that pre-modern 
societies consisted of relatively isolated, stable, static, homogeneous peasant communities, in 
which migration was fairly exceptional. Such false notions of stable peasant societies can be 
associated with a more sedentarist conservatism rooted in Western, or at least European, thinking 
(Bakewell 2008; McDowell and de Haan 1997). In particular, it was deeply embedded in the 
work of the early structural-functionalist school of anthropology whose conservative analysis of 
African societies portrayed them as homogeneous, largely unchanging and isolated from other 
groups (Evans-Pritchard 1951; Radcliffe-Brown 1952). Such ideas were already overturned by 
the Manchester School of anthropologists (e.g. Van Velsen 1960) in the second half the twentieth 
century for whom labour migration was an important and recurring theme of research. Migration 
scholars have also drawn attention to this fallacy, for example Skeldon (1997:32) argued that the 
idea that the Industrial Revolution uprooted peasants from their stable communities for the first 
time was in fact a romanticized elitist view of peasant life. Historical research on Europe and 
Japan and in present-day rural developing societies has shown that peasant societies are, and 
have generally been, highly mobile (Castles and Miller 2009) 
 
Second, romanticized views of a sedentary past, however illusionary, have had a very profound 
influence on the very concept of development, as currently understood and practiced by many 
academics, donors and policy makers. The concept of development has its roots in the responses 
to the chaos of rapid urbanization and industrialization in the 18th century (Cowen and Shenton 
1995). Large-scale rural-to-urban migration has almost universally been perceived as a threat. In 
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European citoyens and urban-based governments 
perceived rural immigrants as a threat to their established lifestyles, in largely similar ways as 
urban-based elite groups in developing countries perceive them nowadays (De Soto 2000).  
 
From the outset of the colonial period, the control of mobility was of critical importance. The 
functioning (and profitability) of the colonial state required that people move to work. It needed 
large concentrations of populations to come together to provide the labour for mines, plantations 
and the colonial administration. At the same time, with this large-scale movement of people there 
was great concern to ensure that such people did not settle permanently in these new centres 
(Rakodi 1997). Such concerns remained high on the agenda of the emerging field of 
development studies and practice from the 1950s (Bakewell 2008).  
 
Thus, from the outset large-scale untrammelled migration has been cast as a development 
problem. While this view appears to have changed over the last decade, there remains a very 
strong sedentary bias in much of the development practice and literature (Bakewell 2008). It is 
indeed striking that many scientific studies and the overwhelming majority of policy documents 
seem to aim either implicitly or explicitly at stopping or at least decreasing internal and 
international migration (Todaro and Maruszko 1987:111). Most policies are implicitly or 
explicitly negative on migration and the control and limiting of migration remains a stated goal 
(McDowell and De Haan 1997). It is intriguing that such migration-decreasing aims are often 
formulated without explaining why this would actually be desirable. This exemplifies that 
migration tends to be put a priori in a strongly negative light (de Haas 2003). 
 
3. Mobility as human development  
 
The previous section has assessed the intricate links between the structural transformation 
processes at the macro-level – commonly referred to as ‘development’ – on the one hand, and 
population mobility on the other. The emergence of contemporary migration patterns is 
intimately linked to capitalist development, globalisation and the associated social, economic and 
demographic transformation or transition of both origin and destination areas. In the global South 
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and North, migration has been part and parcel of the associated processes of capitalist growth, 
industrialisation, urbanisation and demographic transitions.  
 
Migration is an intrinsic part of that process rather than an independent cause or consequence of 
it.5 Thus migration is both a cause (among many) and a consequence (among many) of processes 
of social transformation, which underpin human development. Our analysis has also shown that 
recent changes in the global political economy have spurred South-North migration but have also 
given rise to increasingly complex and multi-polar migration patterns due to the rise of new 
migration poles in the Gulf, East and South-East Asia but also particular countries, for instance 
Ghana, Nigeria, Gabon, South Africa and Libya in Africa. 
 
However, it would be misleading to represent human mobility merely as a derivative of 
structural transformation processes usually embodied in the term ‘development’, as such a view 
would reduce migrants to pawns that passively react to macro-forces, thereby ruling out their 
agency. As argued above, because people have agency, human mobility is as much part of such 
transformation processes as a factor affecting such processes. The previous section outlined how 
at the macro level mobility can be understood as an intrinsic part of structural change or 
‘development’. In an attempt to further explore the dialectics between structure and agency 
involved in mobility-migration interactions, the following section will attempt to explore this 
relationship at the micro-level.  
 
As argued above, it is difficult to analytically separate mobility and human development, 
because mobility is and has always been an intrinsic part of broader processes of structural 
change. The causality terminology in which much of the current migration and development 
debate is framed is therefore problematic. Another major factor that has hampered a transparent 
debate on the relation between human mobility and development is the common absence of 
                                                 
5 While this paper questions conventional cause and effect visions of the relationship between migration and 
development, we do obviously not question causal theory as such. The key point here is that the relation between 
migration and development is one of bidirectional or mutual causation. Migration does have an independent effect 
on human development and broader structures, and vice versa (the author thanks one of the reviewers at UNDP for 
drawing his attention to this point).  
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explicit definitions of development. While it is apparently taken for granted that there is a 
common understanding of the term, in fact different academic disciplines, ideologies and 
individuals attach many different meanings to the term development. The lack of explicit 
definitions of ‘development’ has rendered academic and policy debates on the connections 
between mobility, migration and development particularly muddled. Many disagreements in the 
migration and development debate and the seemingly contradictory results of empirical studies 
can therefore often be related to different implicit meanings attached to the term development 
and differences in level of analysis.  
 
It is probably safe to say that the conventional understandings of development – and its relations 
to mobility and migration – focus on the nation state and that the most conventional yardstick to 
‘measure’ development has been income growth at the national level. To a certain extent, this 
national focus is understandable if we realise the importance of nation-states and national 
borders in shaping current forms of ‘modern’ mobility. The nation-state focus also lies at the 
heart of conventional distinctions such as between mobility and migration, internal and 
international migration and legal and illegal migration.  
 
While the nation-state perspective is vital for understanding current ‘modern’ human mobility, it 
becomes problematic when it becomes the main or only perspective through which the 
phenomenon is analysed. This has certainly been the case in much social scientific research into 
the phenomenon, which has been deeply influenced by governmental perspectives preoccupied 
by the desire to control mobility, i.e. to ‘manage migration’ (cf. IOM 2008) and harness 
migration for national (economic) development. Because of funding mechanisms, governments 
and multilateral migration agencies such as IOM have biased research agendas towards such 
state-centred perspectives.  
 
In a seminal paper, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) provided a fundamental critique of 
‘methodological nationalism’ – the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social 
and political form of the modern world. This assumption has deeply influenced social science 
research on the topic. They argued that there are strong parallels between nationalist thinking and 
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the conceptualization of migration in post-war social sciences. The focus on nation-states and the 
agency of states has also coincided with an overestimation of the role of migration policies in 
explaining migration and a concomitant neglect of supra-national and sub-national forces driving 
migration, such as global economic restructuring and the role of migrant networks in sustaining 
migration processes. This is unfortunate, because this leaves out of the picture the motivations 
and implications of migration for the well-being of individuals, families and communities.  
 
Equally, concerns about the ‘brain drain’ reveal a single focus on the national level, leaving out 
of the question the progress individuals can make through migrating from environments which 
offer little prospect for work satisfaction and individual development. In the same vein, much 
pessimism about the contribution of migration to development in Mediterranean sending 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s originated in widespread disappointment among governments 
when initially (unrealistic) expectations that remittances and (return) migration would leverage 
national economic development were not realised (Bovenkerk 1978; De Mas 1978; Entzinger 
1985; Hamdouch, Berrada, Heinemeijer, De Mas, and Van der Wusten 1979; Penninx and van 
Renselaar 1978). However, this focus on the instrumental function of migration for national 
economic development completely leaves out of the picture that migration might have improved 
livelihood security and overall well-being of migrants and their families (de Haas 2003). The 
other way around, a governmental focus on national economic growth as the only yardstick to 
measure the contribution of migration to development of the nation can provide justification for 
policies that harm the well-being of individual migrants and their families and exclude them 
from fundamental human rights, or even portray certain migrants as fundamental threats to social 
and physical security.  
 
Classical views of migration and development also largely rule out individual agency, 
representing migrants as passive pawns being pushed around by economic macro-forces. It 
would therefore be useful to base our analysis of mobility and development on a broader, more 
inclusive and agency-oriented concept of human development as put forward by Amartya Sen, 
who defined development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy 
(Sen 1999). In order to operationalise such freedoms, Sen used the concept of human capability, 
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which relates to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to 
enhance the substantive choices they have.  
 
Sen argued that income growth itself should not be the litmus test for development theorists, but 
the question should be whether the capabilities of people to control their own lives have 
expanded. The fundamental assumption here is that the expansion of human capabilities is 
desirable because it adds to the quality of people’s lives. Sen argued that freedom is central to the 
process of development for two reasons. First of all, there is the intrinsic importance of human 
freedoms as an objective of development, which has to be clearly distinguished from the 
instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of different kinds in also contributing to economic 
progress.  
 
So, the value of freedoms should not only be judged in their income-generating capacity, but 
should first and foremost be seen as the principal ends of development in themselves. Sen’s 
fundamental point is that freedoms, such as the opportunity to live long and healthy lives, being 
well-housed and well-clothed, having the right and access to basic education, enjoying the 
freedom of employment choice, being able to participate in public debate without fear, and so on, 
are intrinsic developmental virtues in themselves. Second, besides their intrinsic value, 
increasing individual freedoms (better education, skills, health, security and access to markets 
and politics) also happen to be instrumental in promoting economic growth and the further 
expansion of human freedoms.  
 
Although Sen’s use of the concept of freedom is not entirely unproblematic,6 his 
conceptualization of development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that 
people enjoy allows us to take a much broader and more universal view of the character of 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that the concept of freedom or liberty is not unproblematic and that there is no general 
agreement on the definition of the concept. This point was emphasized by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin, Isaiah. 1958. Two 
Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press.), who made a basic distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
freedom. Negative liberty for Berlin is freedom from restraint, that is, being free from the interference of ‘others’. 
Positive liberty is that which the state permits by imposing regulations that limit some freedoms in the name of 
greater liberty for all. There is a clear tension between both forms of liberty, but Berlin argued that both kinds of 
liberty were required for a just society. Equally, Sen (1999) implicitly includes both forms of liberty in his concept 
of freedom, although the tension is not explicitly resolved.  
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mobility. Within a capabilities framework, migration is an integral part of human development 
for two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, people can only move if they have the capability 
to do so and, thus mobility can be conceived as a way of exercising capabilities. This obviously 
excludes slavery and deportation, which are the very products of unfreedom, but may include 
almost all other forms of migration (including many refugee movements and trafficking) where 
at least some degree of agency is involved.  
 
If people expand their social, economic and human capital this tends to coincide with increasing 
potential levels of mobility. Increased income, income differentials and associated relative 
deprivation as well as improved access to information and education tend to increase people’s 
capabilities and aspirations to move. It is therefore no coincidence that highly developed 
societies also tend to be highly mobile.  
 
The act of moving in itself can add to people’s wellbeing. This is not only obvious in forms of 
mobility such as tourism, but the desire for adventure and curiosity seems to motivate youngsters 
around the world to discover new horizons. This is the intrinsic argument why mobility is an 
integral part of human development. The more instrumental reason is that the act of migrating – 
the move to a place offering more opportunities in terms of work, education, political rights, 
safety, health care – may also give people the capabilities to increase their social, economic and 
political freedoms, and that the prospect of acquiring such capabilities often strongly motivates 
people to migrate even if the act of migrating itself does not positively affect or even decrease 
their well-being. If people’s capabilities are positively affected by migration, this may increase 
other people’s capabilities to migrate through the effect of remittances, migration-related 
information and social capital in the form of migrant networks lowering the costs and risks of 
migrating. Alternatively, those whose capabilities are enhanced by migration may respond by 
attempting to close down the option for those who come afterwards, thereby reducing the 
capabilities of others.  
 
However, there is an obvious danger in reasoning that mobility itself is a form of development. 
Although migration almost always includes some degree of agency, migration may also imply a 
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decrease in wealth and well-being, especially if such decisions are taken in highly constrained 
environments. The human capabilities perspective is an agent-oriented approach, as it stresses 
the capacity and responsibility of individuals to shape their own destiny. Nevertheless, it is 
important to bring structure back into the picture by stressing that the scope for human agency is 
often severely limited by structural constraints—especially in developing countries. The extent to 
which migrants are really capable of shaping their own lives (i.e., of acting as free agents) is 
extremely contingent on the wider institutional and natural environment in which people live. 
The vital argument migration scholars have been making is that South-North and South-South 
migration can be a livelihood strategy used by households to overcome developmental 
constraints such as imperfect markets, unemployment, and inadequate government services in 
order to reduce income risks (Stark 1991; Stark and Levhari 1982) and to access resources 
elsewhere that will enable them to increase their freedoms.  
 
From a capabilities perspective it is possible to identify three general mechanisms by which 
migration and human development are interrelated. First, a certain minimum level of 
development is necessary for migration to occur in substantial numbers. People need certain 
freedoms and access to social and economic resources in order to be able to migrate. This relates 
to the intrinsic value of the very freedom of moving and working (Sen 1999). While 
acknowledging the potential intrinsic value of migration as a liberating experience in itself, it is 
highly important to stress that freedom of mobility also pertains to the freedom not to migrate. 
Therefore, if people move involuntarily because of political conflicts or if other people force 
them to do so (e.g., slave trade, governments resettling people, etc.) migration can be a direct 
expression of a lack of freedom. Such exploitative forms of forced migration may serve the direct 
economic interests of others, but often represent a clear decrease in the well-being of the 
migrants themselves. 
 
Second, migration has the potential to affect the well-being of the migrants and the families, 
communities and nations they belong to. Migration-fuelled improvements in living standards and 
well-being through better housing, sanitation, food, clothing, and electronic household 
appliances have often been dismissed as ‘non-developmental’. Diatribes by academics and policy 
24 
 
makers against migrants for their profligate and unproductive ways of spending their money are 
often unfounded because of a failure to understand the complex, often indirect ways that such 
expenditure can improve the economic status of households and communities (Taylor, Arango, 
Hugo, Kouaouci, Massey, and Pellegrino 1996:397+411). However, in a capabilities perspective, 
well-being aspects are intrinsically developmental as long as they increase the capacity of people 
to be more secure and live the lives they have reason to value. Such well-being aspects are to be 
considered developmental virtues in themselves, although they have to be weighed against the 
considerable psychological and social costs that migration may also entail. 
 
Third, besides the intrinsic and direct well-being enhancing potential of migration as such, the 
freedom-enhancing potentials of migration may also have an instrumental value in increasing 
people’s capabilities to improve their livelihoods and in contributing to general economic growth 
and social change, the benefits of which may also accrue to people in non-migrant households.  
 
However, it is important not to jump to the conclusion that migration has ‘thus’ a direct positive 
impact on the overall well-being of people and their capabilities. The specific impact of 
migration on development is mediated by other contextual factors, which explain why there is 
nothing deterministic about the migration-development relationship. Migration may have widely 
diverging—positive or negative—concrete impacts on the lives of people, depending on the type 
and causes of migration, the selectivity of migration, and, above all, the broader developmental 
context in which migration occurs. This exemplifies the need to connect the analysis of agency 
and structure in order to understand the fundamental heterogeneous links between migration and 
human development. Based on a review of the empirical literature, the following sections will 
explore the diverse ways in which mobility affects human development in sending countries, 
thereby distinguishing impacts on individual, community/regional and national levels.  
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4. Mobility as a driver of human development7  
4.1. Income, poverty and social inequality 
Rather than a response to destitution, migrations tend to be a livelihood strategy pursued by 
social groups (typically households) in reaction to relative deprivation (cf. Quinn 2006; Stark and 
Taylor 1989; Taylor 1999) to spread income risks and, if possible, improve income levels. 
Registered remittances sent back to developing countries rose from $31.1 billion in 1990 to 
$76.8 billion in 2000 and to no less than $240.0 billion in 2007. This surge partly reflects the 
surfacing of erstwhile informal remittances, improved recording of remittances and depreciation 
of the US$. 
 
There is little doubt about the importance of remittances in improving the livelihoods of millions 
of people. To put this into a perspective, it is claimed that remittances are close to tripling the 
value of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to low-income countries (GCIM 
2005; Glytsos 2002; Orozco 2002). Because many remittances are sent through informal 
channels, the actual importance of remittances is even higher than official figures show. Thanks 
to highly developed informal remittance systems, the economies of countries such as Surinam, 
Fiji and, particularly, Somalia, are in a much better state than official figures would lead one to 
believe (Gundel 2002; Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley 2005).  
 
Even relatively small amounts of remittances can substantially improve the livelihoods and 
wellbeing of migrants and their families in sending countries. A range of empirical studies have 
confirmed the positive contribution of international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, 
food, health and living conditions in migrant sending places and regions (de Haas 2007a; 
Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and Taylor 1998; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; 
WorldBank 2001).  
 
However, the extent to which households succeed in achieving these goals of livelihood 
                                                 
7 This section is partly based on an existing review of the relevant empirical literature: de Haas, Hein. 2007. 
Remittances and Social Development: A Conceptual Review of the Literature. United Nations Research Department 
for Social Development, Geneva; available online.  
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improvement critically depends on the destination and selectivity of migration, in which South-
North migration generally yields greater increases in income and livelihoods security than 
internal or South-South migration. For instance, recent studies conducted in Burkina Faso 
(Hampshire 2002; Wouterse 2006) and Morocco (de Haas 2006a) suggest that internal and 
(South-South) migration within the African continent should primarily be seen as a means to 
enhance livelihood security through income diversification and that welfare gains are relatively 
small. From both countries, it was mainly migration to Europe that allowed household to 
accumulate substantially more wealth besides stabilising incomes.  
 
Importantly, remittances tend to be counter-cyclical and, hence, have an important function in 
protecting families from income shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or 
climatic vagaries and help household to spread income risks and smooth consumption (Alper and 
Neyapti 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2005; Blue 2004; Kurosaki 2006; Lindley 2006).  
 
Migration and remittances are often ascribed a poverty reducing role. However, the fact that 
migration tends to be a selective process means that most remittances do not tend to flow to the 
poorest members of communities (CDR 2002; cf. Schiff 1994), nor to the poorest countries (cf. 
Kapur 2003; Kapur and McHale 2003). We should therefore be cautious about their poverty-
decreasing role. However, there is some evidence that migration and remittances contribute to 
poverty reduction (Adams 2004; Adams and Page 2005; de Haan 1999). First of all, only a 
relatively small increase in remittance income can lift people out of poverty. When poor 
households receive remittances, this can have a large effect on poverty reduction (Adams 2004). 
Secondly, poor non-migrants may be affected indirectly through the economy-wide effects of 
remittance expenditure on wages, prices and employment in migrant sending communities and 
countries (Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel 1988; Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey 1996).  
 
Also the effect of migration on income distribution and social inequality is primarily a function 
of migration selectivity. A recent overview of case studies on migration and inequality across 
developing countries demonstrated how the relation between migration and inequality varies 
both between and within regions (Black, Natali, and Skinner 2005). If migrants mainly originate 
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from relatively wealthy households, which is often the case, migration is more likely to imply 
greater inequality in the community of origin. Increasing income inequality can exacerbate 
relative deprivation, and, hence, further increase aspirations to migrate among non-migrants.  
 
Because South-South or internal migration is often less selective than the more costly and risky 
South-North migration, the effect of the latter form of migration is more likely to be inequality-
increasing. A recent survey conducted in Mexico found that a 10 percent increase in international 
remittances increased rural inequality by 2.8 percent, and that a similar increase in internal 
remittances reduced rural inequality by 0.1 percent (cf. Taylor, Mora, Adams, and Lopez-
Feldman 2005). However, on the intra-regional level, international remittances have the potential 
to decrease rural-urban income inequality. A study in Mexico found that in Jerez, a rural town in 
the region of Zacatecas, remittances led rural income to surpass urban income  
 
However, migration selectivity tends to decrease over time, mainly because of the establishment 
of migrant networks, which diminish the risks and costs of migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 
1998), and the flow back of information (Korner 1987). As a consequence, the often initially 
negative effects of remittances on social and economic equality can be dampened or even 
reversed over time (Jones 1998; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki 1988; 
Taylor 1999). If migration becomes less selective through network effects or less restrictive 
migration policies, this can also increase its poverty reducing potential.  
 
4.2. Remittances, investments, consumption and growth  
Migration potentially enables migrants and their families to invest in places and countries of 
origin. Several studies suggest that households receiving international remittances have a higher 
marginal propensity to invest than non-migrant households (cf. Adams 1991; Lindstrom and 
Lauster 2001; Massey et al. 1998; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Taylor 1999; Woodruff and 
Zenteno 2007), also when controlling for households’ initial wealth. Empirical work also 
suggests the impact of migration on economic productivity in sending areas can initially be 
negative through the ‘lost labour effect’.  
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However, it seems important not to automatically interpret any reduction in economic activity in 
rural areas as a negative consequence. After all, as has been argued above, migration is an 
intrinsic part of more general structural economic transformations and inevitable urbanisation 
trends. As societies develop they are likely to go through many shifts of specialization patterns in 
which some sectors, like agriculture, may become progressively less important, and the decline 
of a particular sector is not necessarily bad for the country’s economic development. The same 
goes for de-population of very marginal rural areas, which seem to be rather a universal 
component of development processes, which may lead to more optimal allocation of production 
factors and increased overall welfare.  
Furthermore, initially negative effects on production can be reversed in the longer term through 
remittance expenditure and investment. Such positive local development effects seem to take at 
least two, three, or even more decades to fully materialize, as migrants have to save money 
before being able to invest. Taylor (1994) found evidence that the combination of lost-labour and 
remittances may affect production in migrant sending regions negatively initially but positively 
eventually. In a study of migration from five African countries to South Africa’s mines, Lucas 
(1987:313) concluded that migration diminishes domestic crop production in the short run, but 
enhances crop productivity and cattle accumulation through invested remittances in the long run, 
and increases domestic plantation and farm wages.  
However, the extent to which such investments occur, and where and in which sector they are 
allocated, fundamentally depends on migrants’ rights, the household’s income as well as the 
specific political and economic conditions in countries and regions of origin, factors which 
eventually determine their attractiveness for investments. This explains why remittances impact 
so differently in different countries and regions. Whereas in some cases remittances have enabled 
migrants to invest in land and cattle (de Haas 2006a; Taylor, Moran-Taylor, and Ruiz 2006; 
VanWey 2005) in other cases remittances have generally not been dedicated to agricultural 
improvements and have overwhelmingly been invested in housing and land (Jokisch 2002).  
Whereas in some cases most remittance-driven investments have been allocated in sending 
regions (de Haas 2006a), in others cases migrants prefer to invest in urban areas (McCormick 
and Wahba 2003). This can even lead to sustained decline of economic activities in migrant-
29 
 
sending regions. This seems particularly the case when sending regions lack adequate 
infrastructure, agricultural resources and urban centres providing opportunities to allocate such 
investments (Berriane 1997; Taylor et al. 1996). Internal migration and South-South migration is 
perhaps more often associated with rural and agricultural stagnation or even decline (cf. De Haas 
1998; Regmi and Tisdell 2002) than international migration to wealthy countries, where much 
higher remittances potentially enable households to substitute the lost labour and to actually 
invest in agricultural and other sectors.  
Consumptive expenses by migrants and their families are often dismissed as ‘non-productive. 
However, local consumptive expenses can have highly positive impacts by providing non-
migrants with labour and income through various multiplier effects (Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel 
1988; Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey 1996). The same holds true for ‘non-productive’ 
investments, in particular in housing, which can generate considerable employment and income 
for many non-migrants (Stark 1980; Stark 1985). In this way, expenditure on housing and 
consumption may have significant multiplier effects in the wider economy (de Haas 2006a; 
Djajic 1986; Russell 1992; Taylor et al. 1996).  
Besides ignoring the indirect ways in which consumptive expenses and ‘non-productive 
investments’ expenses can contribute to economic growth, conventional views on migration and 
development also tend to rest on rather arbitrary definitions of productive investments (Conway 
and Cohen 1998), which also reflects rather narrow views on what actually constitutes 
development. Expenditure in areas such as education, health, food, medicines and investments in 
decent housing, as well as community projects in education, health and recreational facilities can 
greatly enhance well-being and people’s human capital. For instance, there is evidence that 
international remittances have a positive influence on (infant) health (Frank and Hummer 2002; 
Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999). From an individual and capabilities point of view (Sen 1999) 
such effects comprise development, apart from the fact that increased capabilities can also be 
beneficial for economic growth.  
 
Box 1: Impacts of migration on a Moroccan oasis  
The Todgha valley is a river oasis located on the southern slopes of the High Atlas Mountains in 
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Morocco (de Haas 2006a). Since the 1960s, it has experienced large-scale migration to mainly 
France, but also Belgium, the Netherlands, and, more recently, Spain and Italy. Migration and 
remittances have had a profound impact on social, cultural and economic life in the region. 
Taken together, 40 percent of all households are international migrant households of some sort, 
25 percent are internal migrant households, while only 35 percent of all households are non-
migrant. This has coincides with an overall diversification and urbanisation of the region’s 
economy. Only 4.3 percent of all households rely exclusively on agriculture. Even among non-
migrant households, 86.2 percent have local non-agrarian sources of income.  
 
Internal and international remittances account for an estimated 10 and 33 8 percent of the income 
of all surveyed households, respectively. Among households involved in international migration, 
remittances account for 53-59 percent of the total cash income. Remittances represent 36 percent 
of the total income of internal migrant households.  
 
In general, international migration has positively affected economic development in the Todgha 
valley. The relatively high, stable and secure nature of international remittance income has 
enables households to substantially improve living conditions and their well-being and to make 
various investments in housing, agriculture, enterprises, and education. Increased investments 
and consumption by international migrant households have significantly contributed to the 
growth, diversification, partial urbanisation of the regional economy and the creation of 
employment, from which non-migrants profit in indirect ways. This has even led to migration 
towards the valley by migrants from poorer regions. 
 
International migration has also played a major role in the profound transformation of the 
physical landscape of the valley consisting of large-scale construction of an almost continuous 
stretch of houses along the paved roads running through the valley which has completely 
replaced the old nodal settlement patterns of fortified adobe villages (ighermane); and the 
creation of new farms in the desert through motorised pumping and land reclamation. Most 
migrants’ investments remain within the valley and accelerate existing processes of intra-
regional urbanisation; and the rapid urbanisation and the increasing concentration of social and 
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economic activities in Tinghir, the valley’s rapidly growing urban centre where many migrants 
build second houses and allocate their investments.  
 
Besides an effective way of accessing higher income, international migration has also been a 
livelihood strategy to overcome socio-cultural constraints such as ethnic and gender inequality 
for low-status ethnic groups. For youngsters, in particular, migration abroad is also synonymous 
with better educational opportunities and more freedom of personal expression and behaviour. 
While the income of international migrant household is more than double that of other household 
on average, income and living conditions of internal migrant households do not significantly 
differ from non-migrant households. Therefore, risk spreading through income diversification 
seems to be the main rationale behind internal migration. Internal migration also increases the 
chances of gaining access to better-paid jobs in cities and, eventually, to international migration.  
 
International migration has given rise to a new socio-economic divide between households with 
and without access to international migration resources. Sustained inequality between 
international migration ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ seems to be reinforced by the mainly kinship-
based access to migration networks. Recruitment and the absence of visas until the 1973 Oil 
Crisis meant that migration was accessible to the relatively poor. Due to increasing migration 
restrictions, access to migration has become more selective and mainly accessible for members 
of migrant families (through transnational marriages or other family migration strategies) and the 
relatively wealthy. Given the prevailing ‘culture of migration’, this has led to frustration among 
younger, better-educated and highly ambitious generations, who see themselves more and 
blocked from international mobility.  
 
It would be wrong to assume that migration-driven development has led to a decreasing 
propensity to migrate. On the contrary, international labour migration, in particular, to southern 
Europe, experienced a resurgence since the 1990s. Although migration has arguably contributed 
to a substantial improvement in living conditions and to a decrease in absolute poverty, exposure 
to the relative wealth of migrants, along with drastically improved education and increasing 
media exposure, has spurred aspirations and increased feelings of relative deprivation among 
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non-migrants. In brief, the personal aspirations of oasis dwellers have increased faster than local 
and national livelihood opportunities, and migration continues. Despite the generally positive 
impact on people’s livelihoods, there is also reason to believe that the development potential of 
migration is far from being fully realised due to unreliable economic growth, a slow and corrupt 
bureaucracy and legislature as well as an overall lack of trust in the state (de Haas 2006a).  
 
4.3. Gain or drain? Migration, human capital formation and education  
While remittances can bring substantial financial gains for individual migrants, their families as 
well as origin communities, the loss of human capital through the loss of ‘brawn’ (Penninx 1982) 
and ‘brains’ (Adams 1969) are often seen as undermining the economic development potential of 
communities and nations of origin. Although these concerns are valid, we should not forget that 
for individual migrants the brain and brawn drain often mean a chance to find meaningful 
employment, pursue a career and improve the livelihoods of their families. This exemplifies the 
importance of distinguishing individual, community/regional and national levels of analysis.  
 
While the literature on migration and national development in sending countries has been more 
concerned about the emigration of the highly skilled (‘brains’), the literature on migration and 
development in rural sending regions has traditionally been concerned with the loss of 
agricultural workforce (‘brawn’). The massive departure of young, able-bodied men and women 
from rural areas (cf. Lewis 1986) has been typically blamed for causing a critical shortage of 
agricultural and other labour, depriving areas of their most valuable, able-bodied working force 
(Lipton 1980; Rubenstein 1992; Taylor 1984). The research literature indicates that large-scale 
out-migration from rural regions can disrupt economic production and lead to a decline of 
productivity in the agricultural and other traditional sectors (De Haas 1998). However, on the 
longer term this immediately negative effect can be counterbalanced by remittance-fuelled 
investments, provided that the regional investment environment is sufficiently attractive.  
 
On the national level, migration is often believed to be an obstacle to development or even 
aggravate underdevelopment because it would deprive poor countries of their scarce human 
resources. However, there are various reasons to question the brain drain hypothesis. First, the 
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brain drain seems to be only truly massive in a minority of countries. Adams (2003) concluded 
that international migration does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated. In 
two-thirds of the 33 large emigration countries he surveyed, less than ten per cent of the best-
educated (tertiary educated) population had migrated. The emigration of highly educated 
migrants seems to be only massive in a limited number of smaller countries and specific sectors, 
such as health care.  
 
However, the real question is whether such skilled labour would have been productive if 
migrants had stayed. This is too often taken for granted. For instance, in poor MENA countries 
such as in the Maghreb, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen there is high unemployment among university 
graduates. Mass unemployment and frustration among a new generation of relatively well-
educated youngsters has become a general social problem, and it is often suggested that their 
social and political exclusion is one of the major explanations for the radicalism in the region. 
Decades of government job guarantees for graduates have induced students to seek any degree, 
regardless of its utility in the production, since a degree, by itself, has long been a guarantee of a 
government job. Governments can no longer provide the necessary jobs, while statist policies 
impede private sector job creation (Richards 2003:6-7).  
  
In Morocco, for instance, a large share of the new generation of generally middle class high 
school and university graduates form a frustrated new class of youth eager to emigrate. High 
unemployment, the lethargy of the educational system and state bureaucracy, and the general 
inaccessibility to stable jobs for those without good connections condemn many young people of 
this ‘detached middle class’ (Cohen 2001) to frustrating and humiliating inactivity (Davis 1989; 
de Haas 2003). The various associations of unemployed graduates and PhDs form a major social 
movement, which stages regular demonstrations in front of the national parliament in Rabat.  
 
Although such a brain drain can further erode the skill base, and there seems to be a rather close 
correlation between high levels of brain drain and underdevelopment, it is important to 
disentangle cause and effect. Most high skilled individuals migrate because of a lack of 
meaningful employment and career opportunities. This led Lowell and Findlay (2002:30-31) to 
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observe that emigration of the higher skilled compounds the fundamental problems that led to 
skilled emigration in the first place. For instance, the migration of health workers is often 
claimed to be extremely harmful for sending countries, and is said to have created labour 
shortages in the health sectors in countries such as Ghana and South Africa. However, a recent 
study using a new database of health worker emigration from Africa suggested that low health 
staffing levels and poor public health conditions are the result of factors entirely unrelated to 
international movements of highly trained health professionals (Clemens 2007). Such factors 
include unattractive working conditions in the public health sector and the failure to provide 
basic health services (for instance, prevention of oral dehydration during diarrhoea, a lack of 
malaria prophylaxis and a lack of basic primary treatment for acute respiratory infections) which 
do not require highly trained personnel to deliver (Clemens 2007). This is corroborated by 
another study that concluded that migration is a symptom, not a cause, for failing health systems, 
and that most elite health workers would not provide basic health care to those most in need if 
they had stayed (DRC 2006). 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that brain drain can be accompanied by a significant long-term 
brain gain, because the prospect of moving abroad (brain drain) can encourage stay-behinds to 
study (Fan and Stark 2007; Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz 1997). If the opportunity to 
migrate increases the economic returns to education, this can motivate non-migrants to invest in 
education with a view to emigrating (WorldBank 2005). This motivational effect is additional to 
the role of remittances in potentially enabling family and community members of migrants to 
study. Several studies have indicated that remittances increase educational expenditure in origin 
households (Adams 2006; Yang 2004), reduce the likelihood of children leaving school (Cox 
Edwards and Ureta 2003), and increase the number of children, in particular girls, who complete 
schooling (Hanson and Woodruff 2002, cited in; Rapoport and Docquier 2005). Fan and Stark 
(2007) theorised that the prospect of international migration can be an explanation of ‘educated 
unemployment’ in several developing countries, such as the MENA countries mentioned above. 
If the resulting brain gain exceeds the brain drain, a developing country may end up with more 
educated workers (Fan and Stark 2007). 
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On the other hand, there is some evidence that migration may also create negative incentives for 
education. This seems specifically the case in migration systems predominated by low skilled, 
often undocumented migration, where few if any positive externalities of education can be 
expected. For instance, a Mexican or a Moroccan cleaner with a university education in Spain or 
the United States is unlikely to earn significantly more than a colleague with only a primary 
education. There is indeed some evidence from Mexican household surveys indicating that 
international migration has a negative effect on the level of schooling of children (McKenzie 
2006). Other empirical work suggests that schooling has no effect on incentives for international 
migration from rural Mexico, whereas schooling has positive effects on internal migration 
incentives (Mora and Taylor 2006; Özden 2006).  
 
Furthermore, the departure of the highly skilled may have long-term beneficial effects in the 
form of a counterflow of remittances, investments, trade relations, new knowledge, innovations, 
attitudes and information in the medium to long run. Migrants have also played an important role 
as innovating and transnationally operating entrepreneurs and investors in countries such as 
Turkey and India (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). Through such social and political 
investments migrants can contribute to shaping a better societal climate in countries of origin in 
general, although migrants can also destabilise countries, for instance through fuelling civil war 
(cf. Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Van Hear 2003).  
 
Many developing countries face mass unemployment among the highly skilled, which is the 
partial result of misguided education policies, which do not reflect the true skill and knowledge 
needs of developing economies. There is often over-investment in higher education and under-
investment in primary and secondary education and vocational training. This all casts some 
doubt on the assumption that the emigration of the highly skilled would automatically represent a 
loss. In such situations, it may not come as a surprise that many higher educated people wish to 
emigrate to improve their overall well-being and that also many governments consider 
emigration as a useful economic safety valve in order to relieve political tensions (Castles and 
Delgado Wise 2008; Duany 1994; Heinemeijer, van Amersfoort, Ettema, De Mas, and van der 
Wusten 1977). In many cases, the long-term individual and collective gains may effectively 
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outweigh the immediate costs of migration. In fact, many governments consider skilled labourers 
to be an export product and thus willingly create surpluses of certain categories of the highly 
skilled (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; de Haas 2005). 
4.4. Social and cultural change  
While the pivotal role of migration and remittances in social and economic reproduction of rural 
and urban sending communities has been widely acknowledged (Heinemeijer et al. 1977; 
Klooster 2005), migration also tends to affect socio-ethnic structures and culture in sending 
communities and even on the national level. Even more than with economic impacts, it is 
difficult to oppose negative and positive impacts, because they are often two sides of the same 
coin, and some members of families and communities may be affected more positively or 
negatively than others.  
 
For instance, migration, particularly by women, often disrupts traditional care arrangements for 
children and the elderly (King and Vullnetari 2006) and causes long-term separation between 
spouses and parents and children (Pribilsky 2004). On the other hand, migration remittances may 
enable households to improve their livelihoods, children’s education and to substitute family 
carers for paid carers. While international migration may deter personal relations while the 
migrants are abroad, after returning to their origin community, the remittances and savings 
accumulated by migrants also enable the purchase of housing, businesses, and land, which help 
provide the necessary capital to marry and start a family (Parrado 2004).  
 
Box 2: Frustrated migration aspirations and involuntary immobility in rural Mali 
Drawing upon five months of ethnographic fieldwork in a Malian Soninke village, Jónsson 
(2007; 2008) analysed the local meaning of migration and the experience of involuntary 
immobility amongst young Soninke men who aspired to migrate but were unable to do so. In 
Mali, people of Soninke ethnicity are defined by a ‘culture of migration’ and since the 1960s, a 
large number of men from the Kayes region of Mali have supported their rural families as labour 
migrants in France. After the Second World War, Soninke migrants were a welcome labour force 
in France; but from the mid-1970s, restrictions on immigration have increased, and today, 
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unskilled West Africans are generally considered a social burden that must be barred from entry, 
not only in France, but in most Western destinations. A young Soninke man’s prospects of 
pursuing the trajectory of previous generations by making a livelihood based on international 
migration are therefore bleak.  
 
As a thirty-something returned migrant said: “Today there are more young men in the village 
than before, youngsters who cannot go on aventure. They are hanging around, bored, because 
there is nothing to do. The rain usually does not last more than three months. There are no 
industries here where the youth can work. The government has done nothing here! If the French 
do not want us to go there, then they must come here and help us. We have to find the means for 
the youth to work. The youth is the misery.” 
 
The economy of most villages in the Kayes region can be described as ‘assisted self-sufficiency’, 
since farming is complemented by migrants’ remittances. The money migrants remit to their 
relatives in the village is indispensable to the survival of most households. Moreover, the 
communal projects funded by migrants had done much to develop the local infrastructure. The 
Malian government and NGOs are conspicuously absent in Kayes, where most development 
projects are partially or entirely funded by emigrants, who, in a sense, act as substitutes for the 
State.  
 
As a form of livelihood, migration to the Soninke people is not only a matter of money, but has 
also affected the social construction of the ideal life. Jónsson shows that transnationalism and 
migration are vital features of community life. Migration has become central to the ‘social 
becoming’ of young Soninke men and can therefore be considered as a ‘rite of passage’. 
 
Confronted with increased migration restriction, the young men in the village develop various 
strategies to cope with their current sense of immobility. One strategy of social becoming was to 
pursue alternative livelihoods, based on either education or local economic activities. Another 
reaction to immobility was to contest dominant notions of youth and social becoming, either 
through a form of ‘youth rebellion’ or by joining an imagined world community. Migration has 
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become an indispensable feature of the Soninke society and the ideal life trajectory of men. 
Therefore, the increased immobility of young Soninke men constitutes a social crisis.  
 
Villagers’ experiences of transnationalism and immobility are two main features of 
contemporary forms of globalisation. Not only migrants live transnational lives; so do the people 
living in the migrants’ place of origin. But this does not mean that they participate on equal terms 
in the world of global flows. Globalisation is not merely defined by networks – real or imagined 
– but also by a hierarchy of mobility. And while villagers’ enmeshment in global networks 
reinforces young men’s migration aspirations, it makes the experience of immobility the more 
frustrating. 
 
 
Migration and remittances can have profound consequences for social, class and ethnic 
hierarchies in sending communities if lower status groups manage to migrate internally or 
internationally, which may upset traditional social hierarchies (de Haas 2006a; Ilahiane 2001; 
Taylor, Moran-Taylor, and Ruiz 2006). While traditional elite groups might view such migration 
as a devastating process, lower or middle-class groups may have a more mixed or positive 
opinion. In San Pedro Pinula (Guatemala), for instance, the migration and return of Mayan 
residents has permitted them to slowly challenge ethnic roles that have developed over the last 
five centuries (Taylor, Moran-Taylor, and Ruiz 2006). Migration provides income for families 
which may undercut traditions of community service (Mutersbaugh 2002) and accelerate 
processes of family nucleation and individualisation (de Haas 2006a). On the other hand, 
remittances from migrants may benefit sending communities as a whole (VanWey, Tucker, and 
McConnell 2005).  
 
In south Moroccan oases, internal and international migration has been an important avenue for 
upward socio-economic mobility for the haratin, a low-status social group mainly consisting of 
black sharecroppers. In this case, new forms of inequality, which are to a considerable extent 
based on access to international remittances, have been partly superimposed upon the traditional, 
caste-like forms of hereditary inequality based on kinship, skin colour and highly unequal land 
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ownership (de Haas 2006a). There are no objective standards for determining which form of 
inequality was worse. However, it is important not to construct an overly romantic image of 
traditional rural communities. For instance, traditional oasis society used to deny basic human 
freedoms to large sections of the population (including women, slaves, serfs and sharecroppers). 
In such cases, instead of increased inequalities per se, it is perhaps better to speak of new 
inequalities based on access to external monetary resources through livelihood diversification, a 
process in which migration has tended to play a preponderant role. 
 
Levitt (1998) coined the term social remittances to describe local-level, migration-driven forms 
of cultural diffusion. Social remittances are the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital 
that flow from receiving to sending-country communities. Levitt stressed the role of these 
resources in immigrant entrepreneurship, community and family formation and political 
transformations. The social and cultural changes affected by migration and remittances are 
themselves likely to affect future propensities to migrate. In this context, the literature refers to a 
‘culture of migration’ in which international migration is associated with personal, social, and 
material success, where migration has become the norm rather than the exception, and staying 
home associated with failure (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and Taylor 1993) 
(see box 2). 
 
Migration can have a profound influence on life rhythm and ‘seasonality’. In many parts of rural 
Morocco, instead of the traditional harvest seasons in spring and/or autumn, the July-August 
months have now become the yearly economic and cultural peak season, when Moroccan 
migrants living in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands return to spend their 
summer holiday in Europe. Markets are at their busiest, and the summer holiday season has also 
become the peak season for marriages between migrants’ children and family or acquaintances 
living in their region of origin. This continues to propel chain migration through family 
formation (de Haas 2003; McMurray 2001).  
 
Although the expression ‘culture of migration’ is widely used in relation to emigrant sending 
countries and areas – including the Philippines, various West African countries, Cape Verde, the 
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Caribbean and Mexico – the notion has not been sufficiently theorised. We can see a culture of 
migration as a ‘habitus’, which is ‘hard-wired’ or ingrained in the daily life of individuals, 
households, societies and nations. Bourdieu extended Marcel Mauss’s original concept of habitus 
focusing on ‘body techniques’ to include beliefs and dispositions, states of mind that are neither 
wholly voluntary nor wholly involuntary. In the case of migration cultures, those with a 
propensity to migrate will have forgotten, or mythologized, the reasons why earlier generations 
left. By the same token they may continue to migrate even though a rational choice may suggest 
that staying at home is more advantageous.8 The term ‘culture of migration’ can be misleading in 
the sense that it might suggest that the rising aspirations and outward-looking mentality is the 
exclusive consequence of the exposure of non-migrants to migrants’ wealth and their relative 
well-being. Other general processes, such as improved education and media exposure, also play 
an important role in opening people’s eyes to the wider world and other values and help raise 
aspirations (de Haas 2003). It is therefore difficult to disentangle the impact of migration from 
other general transformation processes affecting local, regional and national cultures 
 
Migration by men and women also tends to affect gender relations in sending communities. 
Although it has been sometimes assumed that migration of men encourages the emancipation of 
women who stay behind (cf. Fadloullah, Berrada, and Khachani 2000), limited empirical 
evidence suggests that migration has no or only a limited structural impact on gender roles, and 
may actually serve to reproduce them (Day and Içduygu 1997; Hampshire 2006; Myntti 1984; 
Taylor 1984; Van Rooij 2000). When women migrate themselves, the potential for gender roles 
to change may be larger, but should also not be overestimated. Gammage (2004) found that, 
through migration and remittances, Haitian women have challenged traditional gender roles. 
However, a study of four Mexican immigrant communities in North Carolina, US, challenged the 
expectation that migrant women easily incorporate mainstream US behavioural patterns and 
cultural values. Rather, the authors observed a process of selective assimilation, in which some 
elements brought from communities of origin are discarded, others are modified and others are 
reinforced in this process (Parrado and Flippen 2005).  
                                                 
8 The author is grateful to Robin Cohen for raising his attention to this point and suggesting the reference to the 
concept of habitus. 
41 
 
 
It is important to disentangle the effects of migration and remittances from more general 
processes of social and cultural change affecting migrant-sending communities. The latter are 
often more important, although migration may play an accelerating or reinforcing role in such 
processes. Particularly in the longer term there might be (inter-generational) gains for women, 
such as the education enabling role of remittances and the role models migrant women might 
represent (Crivello 2003; Taylor, Moran-Taylor, and Ruiz 2006). Based on research in four 
Guatemalan sending communities, Taylor et al. (2006) concluded that migration and social 
remittances may permit an erosion of traditional gender and ethnic roles, but that such changes 
are gradual because migrants, despite their increased earnings and awareness, run into a social 
structure that resists rapid change. In the Moroccan Rif mountains, Crivello (2003) demonstrated 
that, by working abroad, women may enhance their roles as economic providers to the families 
left behind, which tends to diminish the potential stigma attached to female migration. 
Traditional gender roles are often maintained throughout the migration cycle, and 
transformations of patriarchal power structures are more likely to be generational (King, Dalipaj, 
and Mai 2006).  
 
Courbage (1996) and Fargues (2006) hypothesized that – besides factors such as higher age of 
marriage, increased female labour force participation and improved education – the migration 
from north African to European countries – as opposed to Egyptian migration to conservative 
Gulf countries, where the effect would be the reverse – has contributed to the diffusion and 
adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms, and so has played an 
accelerating role in the demographic transition. This shows how important it is to take into 
account the specific cultural context of destination societies and the relative differences with 
origin societies when assessing the social and cultural impacts of migration.  
 
4.5. Migrants’ participation in civic and political life  
Migration does not only affect processes of human development through individual social and 
financial remittances. Migration also affects social and political life in countries of origin in a 
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broader sense. Migrants and their descendants often tend to remain involved with origin 
countries through business investments, frequent return visits or collective initiatives to promote 
the development of places of origin.  
 
Migrants often play an important role in the civil society of countries of origin, but many states 
have had ambiguous attitudes towards emigrants. While many states see migration as an 
effective safety valve to reduce unemployment, poverty and political unrest, they also regard 
migrants as potential political dissidents. From this, one can argue that migration and remittances 
can become an instrument to diminish pressure for structural domestic reform and can effectively 
sustain the position of elite groups rather than lead to change and emancipation of minority 
groups (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; de Haas 2007c; Gammage 2006; Kireyev 2006). In 
other cases, migrants themselves are often from middle-class or elite groups (see Guarnizo, 
Portes, and Haller 2003) and, therefore, might not necessarily represent the view of the poor and 
the oppressed, but instead effectively sustain oppressive political systems. 
 
Box 3  Migration for development or instead of development: the Philippines 
 
Since the 1970s, successive Philippine governments have encouraged emigration of workers. 
Millions have gone to the Gulf oil countries or the fast growing economies of other Asian 
countries. Women from the Philippines are important as domestic workers, nurses and other 
service employees in many parts of the world. Filipino men work as seafarers under many flags. 
Millions of others have moved as long-term of permanent emigrants to the USA, Canada or 
Australia. But has emigration done much to overcome economic backwardness and achieve 
development? 
 
Today, the Philippines is the world’s labour exporter par excellence (rather like Italy fifty years 
ago). Eight million Filipinos are abroad, roughly 10 per cent of the country’s 85 million people. 
Remittances grew from US$103 million in 1975 to 12.8 billion in 2006 (CBP 2007). In 2004, 
remittances were equivalent to 11.8 per cent of the Philippines’ GDP (World Bank 2006). The 
state has hailed overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) as the countries new heroes (bagong bayani) 
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(Asis 2008). But for many this degree of dependence on emigration is problematic: not migration 
for development, but migration instead of development. 
 
Filipinos are to be found all over the world. Permanent settlement in the USA, Canada and 
Australia grew from the 1960s. Under the Marcos martial law regime of the 1970s, export of 
labour became a key element of economic policy. Since then, ever-increasing numbers of OFWs 
have been officially deployed overseas on a temporary basis: first to the Gulf States and then to 
other Asian countries. Filipinos also have an increasing presence in Europe, particularly in Italy 
and Spain. Emigration has become part of normal life for millions of Filipinos and their 
communities, leading to the emergence of a culture of migration, in which even 10-12 year-old 
children have the expectation of working abroad (Asis 2008). 
  
The Philippine Government takes an active role in migration management:  
• Prospective migrants have to register with the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA) within the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE). POEA 
is also responsible for licensing recruitment agencies.  
• The Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration (OWWA) was established in 1977 to foster 
the welfare of migrants and their families left at home. It sends welfare officers to destination 
countries, and is responsible for reintegration programmes and workers’ education.  
• The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) was established in 1980 and is primarily 
concerned with permanent emigrants. Its purpose is to nurture the ties between emigrants and 
the Philippines. It also provides courses for departing emigrants. Measures taken in 2003 to 
maintain links with the diaspora include the right to vote in national elections for Filipinos 
abroad and the right of Filipinos who have acquired another citizenship to reacquire or retain 
their Filipino citizenship (Asis 2008).  
 
DOLE is also responsible for sending labour attachés to the 34 Philippines Overseas Labour 
Offices attached to Philippines consulates abroad (Asis 2008). However, Philippine officials 
often find themselves powerless against unscrupulous agents and abusive employers, who may 
have the backing of the police and other authorities in receiving countries. In June 1995, 
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following strong public calls for better protection for migrants, the Philippine Parliament passed 
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act – the ‘OFWs’ Magna Carta’. This Act claimed 
to represent a shift in philosophy away from the primacy of economic goals, in favour of 
protecting the dignity and human rights of Filipinos. Specific policies included selective 
deployment favouring certain occupations and destinations; measures to improve information for 
prospective migrants; and a ‘country-team approach’ to improve cooperation between 
government agencies (Go 1998). 
 
But as Asis points out, the passing of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act ‘was 
important for what it signified rather than for what it has actually achieved’ (Asis 2008). There is 
no evidence of dramatically reduced migration of female entertainers or domestic workers, nor of 
substantial improvement in the conditions of Filipino OFWs. A major difficulty is the 
unwillingness of many labour-recruiting countries to cooperate by entering into bilateral 
agreements with the Philippines, or by adhering to multilateral instruments such as ILO 
Conventions and the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families. 
 
The Philippines is an important test case: the country has become a primary source of workers 
and skilled personnel in the global labour market. Remittances have improved the lives of many 
poor families and communities. But there is little sign of significant developmental impacts. 
Indeed the Philippines has fallen behind other countries that were economically comparable a 
generation ago, like Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. Long-term – and indeed deepening – 
dependence on labour export and remittances is not a recipe for sustainable economic and social 
development. As Asis states: ‘None of the Asian countries that had made the transition from 
country of origin to country of destination made it on the strength of deployment and/or 
remittances’ (Asis 2008). 
 
On the other hand, the dependence of states on remittances for maintaining domestic stability 
and financing trade deficits can increase their willingness to engage with emigrant populations 
and increase their voice in internal political affairs. Migrants’ considerable political and 
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economic weight can therefore eventually create a push for political and economic reforms, 
democratisation, increasing transparency, and the emancipation of minority groups in sending 
states (Eckstein 2004; Massey et al. 1998; Newland and Patrick 2004; Van Hear, Pieke, and 
Vertovec 2004). Recently, more and more states have embarked upon ‘diaspora engagement 
policies’ through extending political and economic rights to emigrants and allowing dual 
citizenship (cf Gamlen 2006) 
 
For instance, the Moroccan state has long attempted to maintain tight control on ‘its’ subjects 
living in Europe. Since the 1960s, the state actively discouraged migrants’ social and political 
integration because this was seen as endangering the flow of remittances and creating political 
opposition from outside. However, the failure of these ‘remote control’ policies and an ominous 
stagnation in remittances prompted the state to change course over the 1990s. On the surface, 
repression has given way to the active courting of the rapidly expanding diaspora. Along with 
policies to facilitate holiday returns, remittances and to co-opt former exiles, the state adopted a 
positive attitude towards migrants’ dual citizenship and integration. Despite the apparent success 
of these policies, the recent spectacular increases in remittances and holiday visits could only be 
achieved because of continuing emigration and because these targeted policies were an integral 
part of a more general process of reform. However, reform has only been partial and the state has 
not given up a number of instruments to control and foster links with ‘its’ emigrants. While the 
state tries to strike a delicate balance between courting and controlling the expanding Moroccan 
Diaspora, some European politicians see these policies as running counter to integration policies. 
This can result in conflicting sovereignty claims made by Moroccan and European states (de 
Haas 2007c). 
 
The Turkish government, aware that the Turkish migrant communities contribute important 
‘political’ remittances, has actively promoted programmes and policies to encourage migrants’ 
involvement in Turkey. Most initiatives offer financial incentives. These include allowing tariff-
free imports for the channelling of remittances and inviting the conversion of foreign currency 
savings into Turkish lira to establish Turkish Workers Companies. Other policies offer a mixture 
of financial and civic incentives, such as the reduction of the compulsory national service period 
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in exchange for a payment in foreign currency to the government. The experiences of migrant 
communities in destination countries can also prompt legal changes. In response to Turkish 
immigrants’ concerns regarding property ownership, political rights and the military service, the 
Turkish government modified its citizenship law in 1981 to allow for dual citizenship. This at 
once recognised that Turkish immigrants abroad were not guest workers and therefore needed to 
secure their rights abroad, but also allowed them to retain citizens’ rights such as the ability to 
operate businesses and to work in Turkey like any Turkish citizen (Avci and Kirişci 2008).  
 
Box 4: Diaspora associations and development: evidence of impacts on origin communities 
in Ghana and Senegal 
Migrants frequently establish associations, often referred to as Hometown Associations (HTAs), 
with the aim of pooling their resources in order to promote development projects in communities 
of origin. Although such ‘collective remittances’ are very limited in comparison to individual 
remittances, such initiatives have the potential to overcome at least some structural obstacles to 
development, such as lack of roads and potable water distribution systems. Migrants’ collective 
development initiatives have featured centrally in recent debates on migration and development. 
They also form the focus of ‘co-development’ policies adopted by France and other European 
countries (de Haas 2006b). To increase the impact and sustainability of projects, migrant 
associations have created partnerships with governmental and non-governmental organisations as 
well as the private sector (Orozco and Rouse 2007).  
 
There is not much knowledge on the actual impact of such development projects due to 
weaknesses in project monitoring and assessment (Orozco and Rouse 2007). However, such 
assessments exist for some projects supported by the Migration for the Development in Africa 
(MIDA) programme in Italy and Ghana/Senegal. This programme, which started in 2002, has 
been implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Rome. The 
18rural/local development projects supported through this programme aimed to establish 
partnerships to channel collective remittances of Ghanaian and Senegalese migrant associations 
based in Italy to origin countries. Such collective remittances spent by the migrant associations 
were matched by IOM and Italian government agencies and non-governmental organisations as 
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well as local, provincial and regional government agencies. The projects promoted included 
infrastructural and technological development, agricultural development, responsible tourism and 
entrepreneurial activities, or a combination thereof (Stocchiero 2008).  
 
Project evaluations led by CeSPI (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale) found that the projects 
implemented had positive outcomes, notably through improvements in the quality of life of 
origin communities and of the migrants themselves. However, the observed impacts were 
limited, both due to the small scale of the projects and to the structural constraints that exists at 
the local levels in areas of residence and at the national and international level, such as 
immigration restrictions. Contrary to mainstream migration and development discourse, most 
migrants do not transfer skills to origin countries, mainly because many migrants in the Italian 
labour market frequently find themselves in conditions of low skilled employment and 
underemployment, which do not allow them learn new skills (Stocchiero 2008).  
 
Comparison between the Senegalese and Ghanaian projects also yielded interesting findings. The 
Senegalese associations, which were typically composed of young and single males, were more 
conducive to forge local partnerships than the associations of Ghanaian migrants, whose 
communities were not so open due to their close association with Pentecostal churches. In the 
end, a local community’s interest in participating in political life, the (positive or negative) 
opinion of migrants in communities of residence, the availability of intermediaries to facilitate 
relationships were found to play an important role in migrants’ ability and confidence in 
approaching partners and the success of projects.  
 
The study highlighted the instrumental role of migrant associations’ leaders in creating the social 
and financial capital needed to promote development projects in the origin communities. Their 
ability to bridge cultural landscapes by negotiating within the migrant community and with the 
various stakeholders in the destination country and in the origin area was essential for the 
success of projects (Stocchiero 2008). 
 
Depending on who migrates, migration can be seen as either a force of change or maintaining the 
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current power status quo. Because migrants can have all possible political colours as well as 
religious, ethnic and class backgrounds, the political impacts of migration cannot be easily 
predicted. And, evidently, there is no objective, scientific yardstick to determine which direction 
of political change is ultimately desirable. Migrants can be a potential force for structural 
political change in poor and fragile states. In some countries, (return) migrants who studied and 
worked abroad have played an important role in reforming domestic policies (cf. Massey et al. 
1998). On the other hand, migrants may also contribute both to sustained conflicts, for instance 
by providing support for warring parties (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 
2002; Van Hear 2003). Migrants are often from middle-class or elite groups (Guarnizo, Portes, 
and Haller 2003) and, therefore, might not necessarily represent the views of the poor and the 
oppressed.  
 
Beside individual remittances, ‘collective remittances’ are sent by groups such as hometown 
associations to be used for development projects for the benefit of the community of origin 
(Goldring 2004; Lacroix 2005). These usually take the form of basic infrastructure and 
communication projects such as the construction of roads, bridges, potable water systems, 
drainage, wells, electrification, telephones, and so on. Nonetheless, collective remittances are 
only a fraction of those sent back individually to families (Orozco and Rouse 2007) and therefore 
their potential development impact should not be overestimated (see also box 4) 
 
4.6. Migration, remittances and national economic development  
Whereas studies on the impact of migration on the human development of individuals, 
communities and regions incline towards the positive side, studies on the effects of migration 
and remittances on national economic development tend to be more ambiguous. An important 
caveat is that most of the long-term and indirect impacts of migration on national economic 
growth – such as the impact of migration on the entrepreneurial climate, skill transfers and 
political reform – are almost impossible to measure. Almost all macro studies have therefore 
focused on remittances. Macro-studies on the impact of remittances on national economic 
growth have yielded contradictory findings (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah 2005; Leon-
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Ledesma and Piracha 2004). While some studies find positive effects, others find none or 
negative effects, but most studies that do find significant effects also observe that these effects 
are generally small. It has also been argued that remittances can contribute to undesirable 
currency appreciation (Dutch disease) (Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo 2007), create disincentives 
for domestic savings and support private consumption of (imported) goods instead of financing 
investment, which can potentially hamper competitiveness and increase trade deficits (cf. 
Kireyev 2006).  
 
Conflicting empirical findings on the economic macro-impacts of remittances are not necessarily 
at odds on a theoretical level: The macro-economic impact of remittances is disparate across 
countries because it is ultimately contingent on the social relations and structures in which the 
remitted foreign currency becomes embedded (cf. Eckstein 2004).  
 
Can migration and remittances alone trigger economic growth? Probably not. Although 
migration and remittances play a vital role in securing and actually improving the livelihoods of 
millions of people in the developing world, it would be naïve to expect that remittances alone 
can solve more structural development obstacles, such as an unstable political environment, 
misguided macro-economic policies, lack of safety, legal insecurity on property, bureaucracy, 
corruption and deficient infrastructure. A recent longitudinal analysis on determinants of GDP 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa found that the impact of remittances was much more negative in 
countries with low scores on governance indicators than in countries with better governance 
structures (Ahoure 2008).  
 
With regards to the Dutch disease, it has been recently claimed that Dutch disease is less likely to 
occur with remittances than with natural resource booms, primarily because remittances are 
distributed more widely and are less likely to be associated with exacerbating strains on 
institutional capacity that are often associated with natural resource booms (WorldBank 2006). 
 
In unfavourable investment environments, remittances might significantly improve livelihoods of 
migrant-sending families and communities, but do little to promote growth while provoking 
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passive dependence on remittances and even decrease economic growth. However, if 
development in origin countries takes a positive turn, if countries stabilise and economic growth 
starts to take off, it is also highly likely that migrants will be among the first to join in and 
recognise such new opportunities and, reinforce these positive trends through investing and, to 
some extent, returning to their origin countries. This has happened in the past decades with 
several former emigration countries as diverse as Spain, Taiwan and South Korea, and might 
currently be happening in a country like Turkey, where many Turks living in Germany are active 
as transnational entrepreneurs. In such contexts, migrants’ social, economic and civic activities 
are likely to accelerate such growth and reinforce overall development. 
 
4.7. Conclusion  
Empirical evidence indicates that migration is a vital part of risk-spreading livelihood strategies 
pursued by households and families in developing countries. In particular, remittances have the 
potential to improve well-being, stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty directly and 
indirectly, while their effects on inequality are much more ambiguous, and primarily depend on 
the selectivity of migration. The impressive body of empirical evidence available highlights the 
fundamentally heterogeneous nature of the ways in which mobility affects processes of human 
development. Depending on the specific context in which migration occurs, the level of analysis 
and the dimension of development considered as well the selectivity of migration, migration can 
affect human development both positively and negatively, and such impacts tend to vary across 
different classes and population groups and are also contingent on spatial and temporal scales of 
analysis. This should forestall any blanket assertions on this issue.  
 
Box 5 Migration as a force for change or for reinforcing the status quo? 
 
A recent book based on studies of the experiences of five major emigration countries – India, 
Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and Turkey – sought to examine whether migration had in fact 
helped bring about sustainable development in these countries (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; 
Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). With regard to economic remittances, the country studies 
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showed a diversity of experiences within and between countries of origin. The general lesson 
from the comparison was that remittances did not automatically lead to economic and social 
changes of benefit to the population of emigration countries. The claimed positive link between 
remittances and economic growth only applied if appropriate policies were put in place to 
encourage legal transfers and productive investment, to reduce corruption and unnecessary 
bureaucracy, and to provide an investment-friendly infrastructure.  
 
The experience with technology transfer and return of the highly skilled was rather similar: 
positive effects were only realised if opportunities and structures in emigration countries changed 
in such a way that emigrants did return before the end of their working lives. A further pre-
condition was that skilled migrants were able to enhance or at least maintain their qualifications 
while away. This was often not the case, since skilled migrants might be employed in low-skilled 
jobs. 
 
Social remittances could also have varying effects. The message coming back to origin 
communities from migrants could be that new ways of working, investing and running public 
affairs can bring prosperity, but it could also be that emigration was the only way out of a 
hopeless situation. The emergence of migration as a ‘rite of passage’ for young people could lead 
to a loss not only of productive workers, but also to the absence of agents of change.  
 
The social and economic costs of emigration can be high: the country studies drew attention to 
the distress caused by long-term separation of families (such as the ‘Gulf wives syndrome’ in 
India); the distortion of education systems re-shaped to meet the needs of destination countries 
(mentioned in the studies on India and the Philippines); the risks and dangers encountered by 
migrants; the potential loss of skills and human resources that can block development 
(mentioned for Mexico, Philippines and Turkey); and the ‘de-accumulation of Mexican wealth’ 
and its transfer to the USA. Overall, emigration of labour – whether skilled or less skilled – 
could lead to serious loss of potential growth for the country of emigration. The question is 
whether this loss can be outweighed in the long run by positive effects. 
 
52 
 
Recognition of the role of diasporas in development did seem an important step forward. This 
new discourse in the international migration field follows changes of perceptions in emigration 
countries and the introduction of a range of measures and institutions to involve the diaspora in 
bringing about positive changes in the homeland. Although all five country studies described 
such efforts, there was insufficient data and research evidence to assess their success. Collective 
remittances for community investment by hometown associations and similar groups are still 
very small in comparison with private flows. Knowledge transfer networks (like India’s Diaspora 
Knowledge Network or the Philippine’s LINKAPIL) seem positive, but quite small compared 
with individual remittances and commercial transfers. 
 
The general conclusion on migration and development was therefore that there was great 
potential for outcomes beneficial to sending country populations, but the conditions for realising 
these were complex and difficult. Strategies of ‘remittance-led development’ seem simplistic and 
naïve. Migration alone cannot remove structural constraints to economic growth, social change 
and greater democracy. There is a need for broadly-based long-term approaches that links the 
potential benefits of migration with more general strategies to reduce inequality and to improve 
economic infrastructure, social welfare and political governance. 
 
The potentially positive impact on human freedoms is neither automatic nor uniform. Under 
unfavourable conditions, migration may actually decrease the capabilities of people, and even 
when its aggregate impacts are judged to be positive, the fruits of migration are not always 
equally distributed among different members of households and communities. Depending on the 
selectivity of migration, it may both increase and decrease inequality. Notwithstanding the often 
considerable blessings for individuals, households and communities, migration is no panacea for 
solving more structural development constraints. Migration can neither be blamed for a lack of 
development, nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive 
investment environments.  
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5. Conclusion  
This paper has analysed the intricate, reciprocal connection between mobility and human 
development. The analysis has shown that migration has always been part and parcel of more 
general, interrelated social and economic transformation processes and that modern forms of 
rural-urban and international migration cannot be dissociated from the interrelated, more general 
processes of capitalist accumulation, economic specialisation, urbanisation, colonial expansion, 
and, more recently, globalisation. In addition, migration is not just a result of social 
transformation but is in itself a form of social transformation, which has feedback effects on the 
societies involved. We have also argued that, from a capabilities perspective, migration can be 
considered as a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom itself.  
 
However, the inherent danger of focusing on individuals’ agency is that we loose sight of the 
importance of structural constraints. These are essential to understand why both the nature and 
development impacts of human mobility tend to be so diverse.  
 
So, any meaningful understanding of migration needs to simultaneously analyse agency and 
structure. Rather than applying dichotomous classifications such as between forced and 
voluntary migration, it is more appropriate to conceive of a continuum running from low to high 
constraints under which migration occurs, in which all migrants deal with structural constraints, 
although to highly varying degrees.  
 
Besides being an integral part of human development, mobility also tends to affect the same 
structural processes of which it is part. Simplistic positive-versus-negative debates on migration 
and development can be overcome by integrating agency-structure dialectics in the analysis of 
migration impacts. This paper agues that (i) the degree to which migrants are able to affect 
structural change is real but limited; (ii) the nature of change in sending and receiving is not pre-
determined; and (iii) that in order to enable a more focused and rigorous debate, there is a need 
to better distinguish and specify different levels and dimensions at which the reciprocal 
relationship between human mobility and development can be analysed. A critical reading of the 
empirical literature leads to the conclusion that it would be naïve to think that, despite their 
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often-considerable benefits for individuals and communities, migration and remittances alone 
can remove more structural development constraints.  
 
For instance, migration occurring under extremely constraining conditions (e.g. that of refugees) 
is unlikely to contribute to national development in origin countries, at least in the short term9. 
Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack 
of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive 
investment environments. If states fail to implement general social and economic reform, 
migration is unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable development. On the other hand, if 
states do create favourable conditions for broad-based national development, migrants are likely 
to reinforce or perhaps even accelerate such already positive trends by investing and returning 
(temporarily or permanently) to their origin countries.  
 
Therefore, policies aimed at increasing people’s welfare, creating functioning markets, 
improving social security and public services such as health and education are also likely to 
enhance the contribution that migration and remittances can make to development. Because 
migration impacts on development depend on broader political and economic conditions, the 
leeway of targeted policies to ‘improve’ migration impacts seems extremely limited. Targeted 
policies are unlikely to succeed if not accompanied by a more general process of structural 
political and economic reform. 
 
For instance, it is difficult to imagine that sending and receiving states will be able to stop 
migration of highly qualified medical personnel as long as structural conditions and working 
circumstances in origin countries do not substantially improve and as long the demand for such 
personnel remains high. In the same vein, it is unlikely that migrants from rural areas will invest 
money in agriculture as long as title deeds on land are extremely difficult to obtain or not legally 
                                                 
9 Current work on the role of refugees and diaspora groups in post-conflict societies Kleist, Nauja. 2008. 
"Mobilising 'The Diaspora': Somali Transnational Political Engagement." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
34:307 - 323, Van Hear, Nicholas 2003. "Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict." Migration 
Information Source, June 1, 2003. suggests that the long-term contribution of refugees to reconstruction and 
rehabilitation can be significant (for better or worse).  
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secure. It is also likely that many ‘temporary’ migrants will become permanent settlers if 
economic and political conditions in origin countries remain negative and if immigration policies 
of destination countries become more restrictive.  
 
Whether migrants will return and/or contribute their money, knowledge and networks to the 
development of the country fundamentally depends on (1) the political and economic conditions 
in origin countries, (2) the extent to which migrants have acquired financial, social and human 
capital in the destination countries, and (3) the migrants’ own preferences and their relationship 
with their country of origin. The importance of the first, macro-contextual set of factors 
fundamentally limits the effects of targeted migration and development policies, such as those 
encouraging migrants to send remittances through formal channels. The second set of variables 
tends to be positively correlated to migrants’ sustained stay and successful integration. This 
undermines the idea currently popular in policy circles that temporary (or ‘circular’) migration 
would somehow be more positive for the development of origin societies. The third set of 
variables is perhaps the most challenging to capture as they are embedded in the migrants’ 
agency. It is often assumed that migrants from developing countries will want to, or should want 
to, contribute to their ‘homeland’ if they have the capability. It is an assumption which would be 
open to much more question if applied to migrants from the ‘North’.  
 
Migration policies of receiving countries condition selectivity, access to rights and socio-
economic mobility of migrants. The evidence strongly suggests that creating more legal 
channels, also for lower-skilled, migration could decrease costs and, hence, selectivity of 
migration, with limited, but potentially positive outcomes for poverty reduction and 
redistribution in origin countries. The corollary of this argument is that current, restrictive 
immigration policies and marginalisation of regular and irregular immigrants do not only involve 
considerable risk and suffering for the migrants involved, but are also likely to have a negative 
impact on the poverty and inequality-reducing potential of migration. The current claim that 
temporary or ‘circular’ migration represents a ‘win-win-win situation’ for destination countries, 
origin countries and the migrants themselves should therefore be treated with reserve. 
Governments of labour-importing countries may well prefer temporary migration of the lower-
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skilled (partly for political reasons in view of the unpopularity of immigration), but it is far from 
clear that this is beneficial to migrants themselves or to the development of their origin countries. 
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